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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to determine how changes in the corporate tax rate affect the capital
structures of Norwegian firms, and how such effects can be explained by established economic
theories. We have applied propensity score matching, difference-in-differences estimates, and
ordinary least squares regressions to determine if the capital structures of Norwegian listed
firms have been affected by the recent reductions in the Norwegian corporate tax rate. While
our models have found a significant reduction in the development of Norwegian debt to equity
ratios compared to the control group during the years 2012 to 2016, we have not been able
to isolate these differences to the years where tax reductions have occurred. Furthermore, the
small sample of firms, along with macroeconomic factors affecting the Norwegian firms during
the time period, make it difficult to conclude any causality between the reductions in corporate
tax rate and the changes in capital structure. Considering these issues, we have been unable to
determine whether Norwegian corporate behavior most closely resembles the behavior depicted
in the trade-off theory, or the behavior depicted in the pecking order theory.
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In 2013, the Scheel commission was appointed by the Norwegian government to examine the
Norwegian corporate tax rate in light of the international trend of lower corporate tax rates
(Norges Offentlige Utredninger 2014:13, 2014). Their main task was to determine how Nor-
way, as a small and open economy, should change its tax regime in order to become more
attractive for both national and international investors and businesses.
The average corporate tax rate in OECD countries has gone from 50 percent in the 1980s
to about 25 percent in 2014 (Finansdepartmentet, 2015-2016). Since the Norwegian tax reform
in 1992, where the corporate tax rate was set to 28 percent, the tax rate has only undergone
minor changes. Meanwhile, neighboring countries have gone further in changing their corpo-
rate tax rate, reducing their rates to between 20 to 22 percent. In 2014, the corporate tax rate
in Norway was about 1.7 percentage points higher than the OECD average and 4.4 percentage
points higher than the EU average, as seen in figure 1. Furthermore, it is apparent that larger
economies like the United States, Japan, and Germany have higher corporate tax rates, while
small and open economies, such as Norway, have significantly lower rates.
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Figure 1: Corporate Tax Rates OECD Countries in 2014. Adapted from (OECD, 2017).
In recent decades, the international economy has become increasingly globalized with capital
markets following suit (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016). Investors are able to invest in a
global scope, making national corporate tax rates an increasingly major factor in deciding the
placement of capital. As a result, consistently having a higher corporate tax rate than neighbor-
ing countries will deter investors. Digitalization has allowed for multinational corporations to
move their profits out of countries with high corporate tax rates and into countries with lower
corporate tax rates because they are no longer as reliant on having a physical presence. As a
result, following the international trend of lower global tax rates has been put on the agenda.
The Scheel commission concluded that lowering the corporate tax rate from 27 percent to 20
percent would assure a tax rate similar to that of Norway’s neighboring countries in the future
(Norges Offentlige Utredninger 2014:13, 2014). A lower corporate tax rate will also reduce the
cost of capital, especially for investments that are financed through equity. This would therefore
also contribute to reducing the tax discrimination of companies with regard to their financing
structure. Furthermore, a lower corporate tax rate will make it less attractive for multinational
enterprises to move profits out of Norway. Finally, with a lower corporate tax rate Norway will
be in a better position to attract businesses and investors in an international environment.
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In May of 2016 the vast majority of the Norwegian parliament agreed to reduce the corpo-
rate tax rate gradually from 27 to 23 percent during the years 2016 to 2018 (Kjernli, 2016).
The tax rate was reduced from 27 to 25 percent in 2016, 25 to 24 percent in 2017 and in
the national budget for 2018 it is planned to be reduced to 23 percent (Finansdepartementet,
2017). The corporate tax rate was previously reduced from 28 percent to 27 percent in 2014
(Finansdepartementet, 2013).
1.2 Research Question
Considering the recent reductions in the Norwegian corporate tax rate, we wish to test how
the capital structure of Norwegian corporations react to such changes. Whether or not there
are any changes, we will try to explain them through economic theory. There are mainly two
schools of thought concerning the capital structure of firms. As explained in the next section,
the trade-off theory suggests that firms try to keep an optimal capital structure considering
their operations and situation, while the pecking order theory suggests that firms are not that
concerned with keeping a capital structure which maximizes their value. To determine how
capital structure in Norwegian firms has changed as a result of the tax reductions, we will use
annual financial statement and market capitalization data from the years 2012 to 2016, on both
Norwegian and non-Norwegian listed firms. We will apply methods such as propensity score
matching, difference-in-differences estimates, and ordinary least regressions.
1.3 Outline
Introduction
The introduction provides the background for our research question, and the main points of the
research question itself. It also establishes restrictions we have made for the thesis and why
they have been made.
Economic Theory
This section provides a definition for the term capital structure as the term is used in the thesis.
Through an overview on the Modigliani-Miller theorem we show how taxes affect the capital
structure of firms. The section also gives an introduction to the trade-off theory and the pecking
order theory, which are the main theories on capital structure. Additionally, the section will
present empirical evidence on other determinants of capital structure.
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Hypotheses
In the hypotheses section we use economic intuition to determine how capital structure in firms
should react to a tax reduction in accordance with both the trade-off theory and the pecking
order theory. The section explains in depth what we wish to test in the later sections and how
we will test our hypotheses.
Data
The data section provides an overview of the preliminary data we have gathered, where it
has been gathered from, and how the data has been cleaned to create the sample used in the
analyses.
Methodology
The methodology explains in some detail the methods we have used, such as propensity score
matching, ordinary least squares regression, and difference-in-differences estimates. The sec-
tion also show how these methods are applied to our sample.
Empirical Results
In the empirical results section the results from the analyses are presented. The section also
tests and discusses any assumptions made in the methodology.
Limitations
The limitations section discusses any weaknesses or limitations in our results.
Further Research
This section provides an overview on any related research we did not have the time or data to
conduct ourselves.
Conclusion
Finally, the conclusion sums up the previous sections, and how our results compare to previous
research and hypotheses.
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1.4 Special Tax Rates
The Norwegian tax regime practices special tax rates for petroleum activities, and shipping
revenues (Finansdepartementet, 1975, 1999). While there has been a reduction in the general
tax rate from 28 % in 2013 to 24 % in 2017, the tax rate for petroleum activities has remained
at 78 % (Finansdepartementet, 2013, 2016). For shipping companies the tax regime is based
upon tonnage and is not comparative to other companies. To deal with these issues, we propose
using a sample of data that excludes these companies, on the same basis commonly exercised
by Statistics Norway, known as Mainland Norway (SSB, 2012).
1.5 Personal Taxes
Any earnings made by Norwegian citizens through dividends or capital gains are subject to
taxation in Norway (Skatteetaten, 2016). Certain theories on capital structure include personal
taxes, but for a number of reasons, personal taxes will not be discussed in this thesis, and
we will focus solely on corporate taxes (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). This decision can be
justified mainly by two reasons. Firstly, Norwegian stock holders are able to delay taxation
of their capital gains through holding companies, which are not subject to capital gains taxes
(Skatteetaten, 2017). Secondly, almost 40% of shares noted on the Oslo Stock Exchange are
held by non-Norwegian individuals not subject to Norwegian taxation (Oslo Børs, 2014; Oslo
Børs VPS, 2017). We will therefore assume that if Norwegian firms calculate their optimal
structure, they do not consider personal taxes when doing so, and that this assumption is also
true for non-Norwegian firms.
1.6 Financial Services
We will exclude financial corporations from our analyses, and focus solely on non-financial
firms. The reasoning for this are the differences in descriptive data as shown in appendix D, as
well as differences in accounting principles (Finansdepartementet, 1998).
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2 Economic Theory
2.1 Defining Capital Structure
Jonathan Berk and Peter DeMarzo define capital structure as ”the total amount of debt, equity
and other securities a firm has outstanding” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017, p. 519). This is the
commonly used definition of capital structure, and is the one that will be used in our thesis.
Our thesis will focus mainly on the proportions of debt and equity within a firm, and how the
recent reductions in the Norwegian corporate tax rate has affected these proportions. While
the definition given by Berk and DeMarzo mentions securities other than debt and equity, such
securities are not included in this thesis.
2.2 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem
In 1958, Professor Franco Modigliani and Associate Professor Merton H. Miller of the Grad-
uate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology, published their
article on The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (Modigliani
& Miller, 1958). The article gave rise to the widely known Modigliani-Miller theorem on cap-
ital structure, which has formed the basis for modern thinking on capital structure (Brealey,
Myers, & Allen, 2011). Both authors were later awarded with The Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences, where The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invest-
ment was named a major contribution to modern theories of financial markets (Nobelprize.org,
1985, 1990).
The Modigliani-Miller theorem consists of two propositions considered under both perfect
market conditions, where there are no taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and asymmetric
information, and imperfect market conditions, such as would be found in real world markets
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Proposition I focuses on the value of enterprises based upon their
capital structure while Proposition II has an emphasis on the expected rates of return based
upon the capital structure of enterprises. This thesis will focus solely on Proposition I, and thus
we will only provide an overview on this proposition, and the underlying assumptions for it.
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2.2.1 The Capitalization Rate for Uncertain Streams
Initially, Modigliani and Miller consider an economy under perfect market conditions, in which
all assets are owned by corporations only through common stock (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).
These assets will yield a constant, yet uncertain stream of cash indefinitely into the future, as
shown by expression (1), where Xi(T ) is the stream generated by the assets of the ith firm in
period T .
Xi(1), Xi(2) , ..., Xi(T ) (1)
These elements are random variables subject to the joint probability distribution:
xi[Xi(1), Xi(2), ..., Xi(t)] (2)
While the streams are uncertain and extend into the indefinite future, the authors assume that
the mean value of the stream over time is finite and represents a random variable subject to a









The average value over time, Xi, is referred to as the return of a share in corporation i.
Modigliani and Miller emphasize that Xi is the stream of profits to the share, and not sim-
ply dividends. They argue that as long as there are retained earnings in the corporation, any
investor should be able to sell their share for an amount that equals the initial price of the share,
in addition to any dividend the share would have been eligible to provide its owner if the cor-
poration had yielded any of its earnings as dividends instead of retaining said earnings.
Furthermore, Modigliani and Miller assume that firms can be divided into classes such that
the return of the shares issued by any firm in any given class is proportional to the return on the
shares issued by any other firm in the same class. This implies that the probability distribution
of the ratio of the return to the expected return is identical for all shares in any same class. This
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assumption permits the classification of firms into groups where the shares of different firms
are perfect substitutes for one another, also known as homogeneous. From this assumption
it follows that in equilibrium the price per dollar of expected return must be the same for all









Where p j is the price, and x j is the expected return per share of the jth firm in class k. pk is the
expected rate of return of any share in class k, and so 1/pk is the price an investor must pay for
a dollar’s worth of expected return in class k.
2.2.2 Debt Financing and Its Effects on Security Prices Under
Perfect Market Conditions
After providing the underlying assumptions to deal with uncertain streams, Modigliani and
Miller drop the assumption that firms can only raise capital through the issuance of common
stock (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Introducing debt-financing allows firms to change their
capital structure as they see fit, causing them to be subject to different degrees of financial
risk even within the same class. As a result, each class of firms is no longer homogeneous.
Following the introduction of a new component to the capital structure, the authors make two
assumptions about the nature of debt. Firstly, all bonds are assumed to yield a constant income
per unit of time, and that income is regarded as certain by all parties. Secondly, debt is traded in
a perfect market where any two debt securities that are perfect substitutes must sell at the same
price. In this sense, Modigliani and Miller assume that debt is exactly the same as equity, with
the exception that while debt provides a certain stream of cash, equity provides an uncertain
stream of cash. Following the underlying assumptions and theory, the authors are able to derive
their two basic propositions concerning the valuation of securities in companies with different
capital structures.
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2.2.3 Modigliani-Miller Theorem: Proposition I
For any company j, the market value of the enterprise, Vj, is the sum of the market value of
its debt, D j, and the market value of its equity, S j (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Let X̄ j be
the expected return on the assets owned by the company, then the Modigliani-Miller theorem
proposition I asserts that in equilibrium, equation (6) must hold:
Vj = (S j +D j) = X̄ j/ρk (6)
Proposition I then argues that “the market value of any firm is independent of its capital struc-
ture and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate ρk appropriate to its class”
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 268). Equivalently, the equation can be stated in terms of the
firm’s average cost of capital, also known as the ratio of its expected return to the market value
of all its securities, X̄ j/Vj:
X̄ j





That is, “the average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital structure
and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class” (Modigliani & Miller,
1958, p. 268-269).
To prove that equation (7) holds, Modigliani and Miller argue that in the case where they do
not hold, arbitrage opportunities will arise, and so equation (7) will always hold in an efficient
market.
2.2.4 Modigliani-Miller Theorem: Proposition I with Taxes
Through proposition I, Modigliani and Miller theorize that under perfect market conditions,
capital structure should have no effect on the value of an enterprise (Modigliani & Miller,
1958). However, under imperfect market conditions, mainly when corporate taxes are included,
this is not the case. When a company is taxed a rate of its earnings after interest, debt acts as
a tax shield. When adding taxes, Modigliani and Miller present the following equation for the
total income for a company net of taxes:
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X̄τj = (X̄ j− rD j)(1− τ)+ rD j = π̄τj + rD j (8)
where X̄τj is total income net of taxes, r is the interest rate on debt, τ is the tax rate, D is debt, π
is the expected net income accruing to the common stock holders.
This equation shows how adding debt will increase the total income of a corporation by rD j
when it pays taxes.
2.2.5 Effects of Interest Rates
When introducing debt, Modigliani and Miller first assumed there was only one type of bond,
and it was equal for all firms within a class (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). In existing capital
markets, however, there are a wide variety of bonds varying with maturity, technicalities, and
the financial condition of the borrower. Referring to both economic theory and market experi-
ence, Modigliani and Miller argue that interest rates tend to increase with the debt-equity ratio
of borrowers. They then assume that r = r(D/S), is the same for all borrowers, and that there
should be a rising supply curve for borrowed funds. While the average cost of borrowed funds
will tend to increase with leverage, the average cost of funds from all sources will still be inde-
pendent of leverage, as long as we do not consider the tax effect. They argue that any investor
should be able to acquire a mixed portfolio of both bonds and stocks, and therefore the average
cost of capital from all sources should be the same for all firms in a given class. That is, any
increased cost of debt will be offset by a reduction in the yield of common stock. It should be
noted that investors will only reap the benefits of the tax shield as long as there are earnings
after interest. For example, if the corporation was to pay all its earnings to interest, there would
be no benefit to the tax shield, and increased debt would provide no marginal value to the firm.
If we consider no costs to having such a large amount of debt, then logic implies that any firm
should leverage itself until it pays all of its earnings to interest.
2.3 The Trade-Off Theory
The inclusion of tax shields in the Miller-Modigliani theorem results in an optimal capital
structure for firms consisting of 100% debt. As this does not reflect reality, many economists
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believe that there must be some cost to having debt. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) state that
the optimal leverage must reflect a trade-off between the benefits of the tax shield and some
other costs, mainly the costs of bankruptcy. Kraus and Litzenberger conclude that in perfect
capital markets, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, but in imperfect capital markets where
taxes and bankruptcy penalties are included, there must be some optimal capital structure that
maximizes the net value of these factors for the individual firm. Myers (1984) presents the
static trade-off hypothesis in which the firm maximizes its value through the trade-off between
the costs of financial distress and the benefits gained from tax shields, as seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2 describes how firms can increase their value through leverage, but the inclusion of
financial distress costs causes there to be an optimal point where the firm is not completely
financed through debt.
Figure 2: Capital structure according to trade-off theory. Reprinted from Myers (1984).
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Myers (1984) argues that if there are no costs of adjustment for changing the capital structure,
then each firm’s observed debt-equity ratio should be its optimal ratio. If there are adjustment
costs, however, Myers argues that there must also be lags in adjusting the capital structure to
its optimum as firms can not immediately offset events that push them away from their optimal
capital structure.
The costs of financial distress presented by Myers include the legal and administrative costs
of bankruptcy, but also the moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs which are present
even when bankruptcy is avoided.
2.4 The Pecking Order Theory
Pecking order theory was developed by Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf in 1984. It
introduces the idea that managers rank capital when contemplating how to raise funds. The
theory stems from asymmetrical information. Information asymmetry occurs when managers
have more knowledge of what the company’s fair value is as they know more about its potential
prospects and risks than outside investors do.
The pecking order theory states that corporate enterprises prefer to finance new investments
through internal financing rather than external and when they need to finance externally, they
prefer raising debt rather than issuing equity (Frank & Goyal, 2008). If managers perceive
the stock price to be overvalued they will be prone to issue equity as this will maximize the
financing generated. Similarly, if managers perceive the stock price to be undervalued they are
more prone to finance investments through debt, instead of issuing equity. Investors are aware
of this and this is reflected through changes in stock prices. An equity issue announcement will
normally cause a negative reaction to stock price. Therefore, if information asymmetry exists
between managers and investors and both groups are rational, then it follows that any company
will raise debt rather than issuing equity (Brealey et al., 2011).
It should be noted that there are likely other factors affecting managers and investors (Brealey
et al., 2011). For example, an already heavily leveraged firm could risk financial distress if it
were to borrow more. An equity issuance would be preferable in this scenario. Also, technol-
ogy firms and small, rapidly growing firms tend to issue equity rather than financing through
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debt as the costs of raising debt for such companies generally outweigh financing through eq-
uity.
In pecking order theory there is no optimal debt/equity ratio because there are two types of
equity (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Internal equity is viewed as the best form of financing and
external equity is viewed as the least attractive form. In this way the theory explains why the
most profitable firms tend to have a low debt equity ratio since they can be sufficient using only
internal funds, while low profitable firms tend to borrow more (Brealey et al., 2011).
2.5 Empirical Evidence for Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory
The main difference between the trade-off theory and pecking order theory is that the former
states that all companies have an optimal debt to equity ratio while the latter does not imply an
optimal ratio. Baskin (1989) states that preceding empirical evidence and his study support that
companies change their capital structure in line with the pecking order theory and not the trade-
off theory. Also, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find no evidence of companies adjusting to
an optimal debt to equity ratio and state that ”if our sample companies did have well-defined
optimal debt ratios, it seems that their managers were not much interested in getting there”
(Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999, p. 242). At the same time, their research was done on mature
firms and the pecking order theory might not provide the same results if the sample consisted
of high-growth companies investing in intangible assets. Fama and French (2002) investigate
which of the theories predict corporate behavior best in terms of capital structure and dividends.
They find that both models do well in their tests, but both have flaws. Small low-leverage
growth firms have large equity issues which contradicts the pecking order theory. The trade-off
theory argues that more profitable firms should have more debt, however, there is found to be
an inverse relationship. Their conclusion is that although both theories confirm many of the
predictions made it is difficult to argue for causality as they are not able to tell if the results are
due to the theories being correct or other factors that both theories overlook. Frank and Goyal
(2009) find that the trade-off theory is superior to the pecking order theory. They argue that
although pecking order theory correctly predicts that more profitable firms have lower leverage
the theory does not predict the importance of industry specific leverage ratios, which they find
to be the most important factor of capital structure. Furthermore, they conclude that the pecking
order theory would need to undergo considerable development to completely predict the main
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evidence found in their study and that the trade-off theory more accurately predicts the reality
of the relationship between corporate behavior and capital structure.
2.6 Other Determinants of Capital Structure
There are many other factors than corporate tax rate that can influence a company’s capital
structure (Titman & Wessels, 1988). The following section will outline some of these factors.
We are including factors where there is a consensus among researchers that the characteristic
has an effect on leverage. These factors will need to be controlled for in our analysis.
2.6.1 Profitability
Profitability is a measure of how well a company is able to generate earnings compared to its
costs. Pecking order theory suggests that more profitable firms will have lower debt-equity
levels because they are able to rely on internal financing. On the other hand, the trade-off the-
ory implies higher debt-equity ratios for profitable firms because it will lower their tax burden.
Also, high profitable firms are less likely to suffer from financial distress and as a result will
receive loans with lower interest rates. This should encourage high profitable firms to take on
more debt. Early research showed a positive relationship between leverage and profitability
(Harris & Raviv, 1991). However, recent empirical results suggest there is an inverse relation-
ship between the two (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 2008; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Fama &
French, 2002).
2.6.2 Asset Structure
Asset structure or tangibility is a measure of how much fixed assets; machines, buildings, etc.,
a company has compared to its total asset base. Tangible assets are easier for a company to
collateralize than intangible assets. A company with a high level of fixed assets will therefore
have higher debt capacity. This is supported by both trade-off theory and pecking order theory.
The majority of research also suggests that there is a positive relationship between leverage and
tangibility (Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank & Goyal, 2009).
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2.6.3 Size
Size is a measure of the scale of a firm’s operations. It can be measured through a company’s
total revenues, total assets or market value. According to the trade-off theory larger firms
are less risky because they are more diversified and have more stable cash flows. Evidence
suggests that direct bankruptcy costs appear to account for a larger proportion of firm value
as size decreases. Also, larger firms tend to be more diversified which means that the risk
of bankruptcy is lower (Titman & Wessels, 1988). On the other hand, pecking order theory
suggests a negative relationship between size and leverage as larger firms have less information
asymmetry and easier access to capital markets. Mature firms also have the possibility to retain
more earnings. Therefore, it will be easier to attract investors and issue equity for larger firms.
Empirical results suggests that the leverage ratio is positively correlated with size, when size is
measured as the natural logarithm of sales (Antoniou et al., 2008) and when measured by the
total book value of assets (Frank & Goyal, 2009).
2.6.4 Liquidity
The liquidity of a company can be defined as its ability to use current assets to cover current
liabilities. In other words, how capable a company is to pay off its short term obligations.
In pecking order, firms accrue earnings when financing future investments because internal
financing is superior. As a result, liquid firms will borrow less. This is consistent with empirical
research done on British firms (Akdal, 2011). However, research done on U.S. firms suggest
a positive relationship between liquidity and debt (Sibilkov, 2009). This is due to costs of
financial distress increasing with illiquidity.
2.6.5 Growth
Growing companies tend to have large investments and as a result require capital, usually
through external financing. Also, growth firms have a high market-to-book ratios because
investors expect higher earnings in the coming years. Pecking order theory suggests that high-
growth firms should acquire more debt over time if they do not have enough internal funds.
However, as claimed by trade-off theory there should be a negative relationship between grow-
ing firms and debt as they are more likely to go into financial distress then more mature firms.
There is a higher chance that a growing firm will invest in more risky projects. Empirically,
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companies with large growth opportunities have a negative relationship with debt as do firms




Considering the trade-off theory, and pecking order theory described in the previous section, we
would expect capital structure to change in accordance with either of these theories. Accord-
ing to the trade-off theory we would anticipate the debt to market value of equity to decrease
through two separate stages. Firstly, there is a mechanical effect when firms are taxed less,
causing their market value of equity to increase along with their profitability. Secondly, the
reduced value added from debt tax shields should steer corporate behaviour to finance less in-
vestments through debt. In any way, we would not expect the debt to market value of equity
to increase according to the trade-off theory. From a pecking order perspective, we would still
expect the mechanical effect to increase the market value of equity. Also, the reduced taxes
would result in increased net income. Consequently, managers will have more internal financ-
ing which will reduce the demand for debt, resulting in a reduced debt to market value of equity
ratio. This intuition shows that no matter which of the theories explain behaviour in Norwegian
firms, we should expect the same results from a reduction in the corporate tax rate.
While we expect the same results from both theories, they might happen at different points
in time. For the trade-off theory firms maximize their value by changing the capital structure
as soon as a tax change occurs, given that the costs of changing capital structure do not exceed
the benefits gained from doing so. For the pecking order theory managers have no direct moti-
vation to change the capital structure immediately. Instead such changes happen naturally and
most likely over a longer time span.
In addition to the debt to market value of equity ratio, we wish to test changes in other vari-
ables. These include the debt to book value of equity ratio, market value of equity, book value
of equity, and total liabilities. As already stated, we expect market value of equity to increase
for Norwegian firms as less tax increases the net income of the firm, and as a result its value.
We also expect book value of equity to increase for the same reason, but firms might pay out
the increased earnings in dividends. Total liabilities should decrease in accordance with the
behavioural effects expected to occur in both theories. If total liabilities are expected to be
reduced, while the book value of equity is expected to increase, it follows that the debt to book
value of equity should decrease.
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To test our hypotheses we will match the Norwegian firms with a control group using propen-
sity score matching. We will use the determinants of capital structure described in the previous
section as matching variables. The only variable affecting the treatment and control group
differently should then be the Norwegian reduction in corporate tax rate. After finding the
appropriate matches, we will apply two different models to find the effect of reduced corpo-
rate tax rate. Firstly, we will use a model that regresses the dependent variables on the yearly
tax changes to test if firms adjust to the tax change during the year it changes. Secondly, we
will use a difference-in-differences estimator to test how the reduction in corporate tax rate has
affected Norwegian firms in the entire period from 2012 to 2016.
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4 Data
In the following section, the data gathering process is described. The financial statement data
is collected from Compustat (S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2017). Compustat is a database
with financial, statistical and market information on active, inactive, listed and unlisted global
companies. The service was started in 1962.
4.1 Cleaning and Sample Construction
The preliminary data was extracted using Compustat’s built-in statistical tools. The sample
used consists of annual financial fundamental data for all global listed companies. We collected
information on the following data points; total assets, total current assets, total liabilities, to-
tal current liabilities, book value of stockholders equity, book value of long-term debt, total
revenue, EBIT, EBITDA, net property plant and equipment, and capital expenditures. In addi-
tion, we collected year end stock prices and shares outstanding in order to calculate the market
value of the equity. We narrowed down the number of companies and decided to only include
Western European, U.S. and Canadian companies. This is because these countries have a more
similar business environment to Norway compared to other countries, with regard to rules and
regulations, democratic stability and capital markets (IMF, 2016). We have also excluded any
companies that were inactive at any point over the time period and companies that were missing
relevant financial data, giving us a balanced panel data set.
The time period, 2012 to 2016, was chosen due to the Scheel commission being established
in 2013. The first year we observe should serve as the pre-treatment period meaning there
should not be any tax effect at this point and it was therefore important to mitigate any sig-
naling effect that the establishment of the commission might have had. Some of the European
countries in the sample, e.g. Sweden, Finland and Denmark, have undergone changes in the
corporate tax rate during the time period (OECD, 2017). Since the companies in these countries
serve as part of the control group and should not include corporate tax rate change effects they
were removed from the sample.
After having cleaned up the sample we had a sample size of 133 Norwegian firms, and 4985
non-Norwegian firms. After removing oil, shipping and financial firms, we were left with 53
24
Norwegian firms. We grouped the remaining companies into their respective industries by
using the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). GICS is an industry taxonomy de-
veloped in 1999 by Morgan Stanley Capital International and Standard & Poor (S&P Global
Market Intelligence, 2016). Every company is assigned, based on its main business activity, a
sub-industry, that fits into an industry, an industry group and sector. GICS is divided into 11
sectors, 24 industries, 68 industries and 157 sub industries. After the propensity score matching
we removed five outliers from the Norwegian sample, and five from the control group. For the
analyses we had a final sample of 48 Norwegian firms, and 48 non-Norwegian firms.
4.2 Currency Conversion
The majority of the companies in the sample reported their financial information in the currency
of the country they were incorporated in. This meant we had to convert into one universal cur-
rency. We decided to use U.S. Dollars as it is the most widely used currency on the international
market (Feige, 2012). In order to account for sales and expenses being distributed throughout
the year, we used the year average currency rate for income statement items. For balance sheet




5.1 Propensity Score Matching
In observational economic studies, a common problem is determining the real effect of a policy
change. This is due to the data being based on individuals, as it is not possible to observe an
identical treated and non-treated individual at the same time. Furthermore, it is not recom-
mended to simply compare treated individuals with non-treated individuals because the treat-
ment or policy change is not assigned randomly to the sample and as a result selection bias
could arise (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a method developed by Rubin and Rosenbaum in 1983,
which is widely used in observational economic studies to estimate causal treatment effects.
The technique matches individuals from a treated group with individuals from a control group,
attempting to establish pairs that have the same statistical background. This means pairs that
have the same characteristics prior to the treatment, hence pairs that would react in the same
way if they both were to be treated. In this way, PSM aims to make the sample randomly se-
lected thus mitigating selection bias. Although, it cannot completely eliminate selection bias
because it only controls for the observed variables as there still could be unobserved hetero-
geneity left leading to biased to results (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
PSM is a probit/logit model with a dummy variable (D) serving as the dependent variable
and characteristics (x) as the independent variables. The propensity score is the predicted prob-
ability of receiving the treatment given the pre-treatment characteristics (Caliendo & Kopeinig,
2008), formally:
p(x) = prob(D = 1|x) = E(D|x) (9)
5.1.1 Steps
1. Assign the observations into two groups using a dummy variable. Where D = 1 are the
treated observations and D = 0 are the untreated observations.
2. Estimate a probit/logit model for the propensity of observations to be assigned into the
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treated group. Use relevant independent variables that affect the probability of being assigned
to treatment group.
3. Match observations from treated and control groups based on their propensity scores. Use a
relevant matching algorithm.
4. Calculate the treatment effects: compare the outcomes between the treated and control




This assumption states that both the outcomes of the treated and untreated individuals are in-
dependent of treatment and conditional on the x characteristics. In other words, after having
controlled for the observable x characteristics, the treatment is assigned randomly and in this




This assumption states that the for each value of x, there are both treated and control obser-
vations. This means that the probability of a random individual being treated is somewhere
between zero and one (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). This can be expressed formally as:
0 < prob(D = 1|x)< 1 (11)
Balancing condition
This assumption states that given the same propensity score, one should also observe the same
x characteristics. Meaning that the assignment of the treatment is independent of the x charac-




5.1.3 Independent Variable Choice
Independent variable choice is important in order to assure good matches. We are attempting
to identify companies in the control sample that are identical to the firms in the treatment group
and that will continue to develop identically all else being equal. The matching variables we
chose therefore have to be good proxies for companies that are of the same size, in the same
industry, have the same profitability, have the same growth opportunities and so on.
The number of independent variables needed for a study is not predefined for PSM as it de-
pends on the scope and scale of the study. However, one should always include variables that
are unrelated to exposure but related to outcome. On the other hand, including variables that
are related to exposure but unrelated to outcome will lead to an increase in bias (Brookhart et
al., 2006). In our model, exposure is the change in corporate tax rate while the outcome is the
corporations’ change in capital structure.
The data set has previously been sorted into their respective GICS industries so we do not
have to include industry as a matching variable. 2012 is the first year in our data set and is the
year before any corporate tax changes are made, it therefore makes sense to use this year for
matching. Since our main goal is to examine any significant change in leverage, we are not
using this as a matching variable.
The independent variables we have chosen are:
Total Revenue is the total amount of income a company receives over the course of the year.
Companies within the same industry that are of the same size tend to have similar revenue. This
variable is therefore a good measure of the size of a company’s operations.
Total Assets is included as a variable because it is a good measure of the size of a company.
Companies that are of the same size and operate within the same industry should in theory have
a similar capital structure.
Market Capitalization measures the market value of equity. It is calculated by taking the price
per share multiplied by total outstanding shares.
Property, plant and equipment / Total assets is a ratio that measures a company’s fixed assets
to total assets.
EBITDA / Total Revenue measures how profitable a company is, through calculating how
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much income a company has left after deducting its operational expenses.
Revenue / Property, plant and equipment measures how much revenue is generated by a
company’s fixed assets. This ratio is an important for measuring the profitability for capital
intensive industries.
Current assets / Current liabilities is a liquidity ratio that measures a company’s ability to
cover its short-term liabilities with its short-term assets.
Price / Book compares a company’s market value of equity to book value of equity. A high
ratio can indicate that there are expectations that the company will perform well in the future.
Therefore, companies in the same industry, that are of the same size and have a similar P/B
ratio might have the same growth opportunities.
In order to achieve better matches based on the proxies for size we included interaction terms.
This allows for size to be weighted more heavily and assures that companies of the same size
will be matched together. Before including these interaction terms large firms were in some
instances matched with significantly smaller firms.
5.1.4 Matching Algorithm
After having calculated the propensity score for each company, the next step is to match a
company from the treatment group with a company from the control group. There are several
matching algorithms applicable for PSM. However, we have chosen to focus on the nearest
neighbor matching method because it is the most commonly used. This method matches each
company from the treatment group with one company from the control group on the basis of
them having the closest propensity score. One can also decide whether a company from the
control group can be used as the nearest neighbor more than once (with replacement) or only
once (without replacement). This introduces a trade-off, one might end up using one observa-
tion too many times with replacement but without replacement one might not get very good
matches (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Since we have significantly more control observations
than treated observations we decided to use without replacement.
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5.2 Yearly Tax Change Model
5.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is a technique widely used to estimate a linear relationship be-
tween a dependent variable and one or more independent variables (Wooldridge, 2012). This
is done through minimizing the sum of squared residuals which is the difference between the
observed values and the predicted values. The smaller the differences become the better the
estimated model fits the data.
Assumptions of OLS
1. Linearity: there exists a linear relationship between the independent variables and dependent
variables.
y = β0 +β1x+ ε (13)
2. There is a random sample of observations of size n
y1 = β0 +β1x1 + ε1 i = 1,2,3, ...,n (14)
3. No multicollinearity: there is no exact relationship between the independent variables. The
the outcomes of the explanatory variables are not all the same.
4. Exogeneity: The Zero Conditional Mean Assumption states that the mean of the error term
(ε) is zero given the explanatory values. This also means that the explanatory variables and
error term are uncorrelated.
E(u|x) = 0 (15)
5. No spherical errors: meaning there is homoskedasticity and no auto-correlation.
Homoskedasticity means that the error term has the same variance given any explanatory vari-
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able.
Var(u|x) = σ2 (16)
No auto-correlation means that the error terms of different obseravtions should not be corre-
lated.
Cov(εiε j|x) = 0 i 6= j (17)
6. Normality of residuals: the error term is independent of the explanatory variables and is
normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance σ2.
u ∼ Normal(0,σ2) (18)
5.2.2 Yearly Tax Change Models
To find the significance of a tax change in a year on the capital structure of firms in the given
year, we use an OLS regression. In this model we create variables that track the percentage
change each year for each firm, and regress these changes on the tax change for that year.
For Norwegian firms there are tax changes in two years, namely 2014 and 2016, when it was
reduced by 1% and 2%, respectively. There are no tax changes for the control group.
Debt to Market Value of Equity Ratio
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in the debt to market value of equity
ratio for each year can be given mathematically as
DEM di f f = β0 +β1×TaxChange+ εi
where DEM di f f is the percentage change in the debt to market value of equity ratio for
each year, TaxChange is the percentage point change in the corporate tax rate for each year, β0
is the intercept, β1 is the effect of a one percentage point increase in corporate tax rate on the
debt to market value of equity ratio, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Debt to Book Value of Equity Ratio
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in the debt to book value of equity
ratio for each year can be given mathematically as
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DEB di f f = β0 +β1×TaxChange+ εi
where DEB di f f is the percentage change in the debt to book value of equity ratio for each
year, TaxChange is the percentage point change in the corporate tax rate for each year, β0 is the
intercept, β1 is the effect of a one percentage point increase in corporate tax rate on the debt to
book value of equity ratio, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Market Value of Equity
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in the market value of equity for
each year can be given mathematically as
MarketCap di f f = β0 +β1×TaxChange+ εi
where MarketCap di f f is the percentage change in the market value of equity for each year,
TaxChange is the percentage point change in the corporate tax rate for each year, β0 is the
intercept, β1 is the effect of a one percentage point increase in corporate tax rate on the market
value of equity, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Book Value of Equity
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in the book value of equity ratio for
each year can be given mathematically as
BookEquity di f f = β0 +β1×TaxChange+ εi
where BookEquity di f f is the percentage change in the book value of equity for each year,
TaxChange is the percentage point change in the corporate tax rate for each year, β0 is the
intercept, β1 is the effect of a one percentage point increase in corporate tax rate on the book
value of equity, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Total Liabilities
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in the total liabilities for each year
can be given mathematically as
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TotalLiabilities di f f = β0 +β1×TaxChange+ εi
where TotalLiabilities di f f is the percentage change in total liabilities for each year, TaxChange
is the percentage point change in the corporate tax rate for each year, β0 is the intercept, β1 is
the effect of a one percentage point increase in corporate tax rate on the total liabilities, and εi
is the error term with expected mean of zero.
5.3 DID Model
5.3.1 Difference-in-Differences
To find the effect of the reduction in the Norwegian corporate tax rate on Norwegian firms, we
use the difference-in-differences estimator. The difference-in-differences estimator estimates
the effect of the treatment through the difference between the treatment and control groups
before and after the treatment (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). For our research question we first
estimate the difference in various variables from 2012 to 2016. Any difference between these
differences, assuming there would otherwise not be any difference, should be the effect of the
treatment. Mathematically this can be expressed as
Yi,NOR,t = D/E ratio for corporation i in Norway if NOR = 1, and for period t
We assume that
E(Yi,NOR,t |NOR, t) = γs +λt (19)
where NOR denotes whether the company is Norwegian or not, and t denotes the period.
The equation shows that Yi is determined by both a time-invariant effect of whether the cor-
poration is Norwegian or not, and a time effect that is common regardless of the corporation’s
origins.
If we let D be a dummy variable for the tax reform, which is only applicable if NOR = 1,
and t = 2016, we get
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Yi,NOR,t = γs +λt +βDNOR,t + εi,NOR,t (20)
where E(εi,NOR,t |NOR, t) = 0.
We then get




E(Yi,NOR,t |NOR = 1, t = 2016)−E(Yi,NOR,t |NOR = 1, t = 2012)
= λt=2016−λt=2012 +β
(22)
The difference-in-differences estimator is then given by
[E(Yi,NOR,t |NOR = 1, t = 2016)−E(Yi,NOR,t |NOR = 1, t = 2012)]
−[E(Yi,NOR,t|NOR = 0, t = 2016)−E(Yi,NOR,t|NOR = 0, t = 2012)]
= β
(23)
In this sense the difference-in-differences estimator should be able to estimate the effect of the
tax reform. It should be noted that we assume that there are no other major factors that are
affecting only the treatment group after the tax reform, and that prior to the treatment there are
parallel trends in Y for the treatment and control group.
5.3.2 DID Models
To find the differences-in-differences between the treatment and the control group, we used
OLS regressions with the percentage difference from the year 2012 to the year 2016 on the
dependent variable in question, and regressed it on an independent dummy variable for the
treatment group. We ran regressions using mainly two dependent variables, including the debt
to market value of equity ratio, and the debt to book value of equity ratio. To decompose
any results, we also ran regressions using market value of equity, book value of equity and
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total liabilities as dependent variables. Considering the assumption that the propensity score
matching should control for any other differences between the firms, except for the treatment,
no control variables are included in the regressions.
Debt to Market Value of Equity Ratio
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in debt to market value of equity
ratio can be given mathematically as:
DEM di f f = β0 +β1×NOR+ εi
where DEM di f f is the percentage change in the debt to market value of equity from 2012
to 2016 for each firm, NOR is a dummy variable for whether the company is Norwegian or not,
β0 is the intercept, β1 is the difference in means between the Norwegian firms and the control
group, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Log Transformation of Debt to Market Value of Equity Ratio
As the OLS-regression for the debt to market value of equity ratio does not meet the assump-
tions as presented in appendices Q - V, we log-transform DEM di f f into log(DEM di f f +
0.939). 0.939 is added to the log-transformation to prevent the exclusion of negative val-
ues of DEM di f f . 0.939 is slightly above the absolute value of the lowest observation of
DEM di f f , which is −0.9384. The lowest observation of log(DEM di f f + 0.939) will as a
result be slightly above zero. We then get the regression
log(DEM di f f +0.939) = β0 +β1×NOR+ εi
where log(DEM di f f +0.939) is the log-transformaton of DEM di f f , NOR is a dummy vari-
able for whether the company is Norwegian or not, β0 is the intercept, β1 is the difference
in means between the Norwegian firms and the control group, and εi is the error term with
expected mean of zero.
Debt to Book Value of Equity Ratio
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in debt to book value of equity ratio
can be given mathematically as
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DEB di f f = β0 +β1×NOR+ εi
where DEB di f f is the percentage change in the debt to book value of equity from 2012 to
2016 for each firm, NOR is a dummy variable for whether the company is Norwegian or not,
β0 is the intercept, β1 is the difference in means between the Norwegian firms and the control
group, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Market Value of Equity
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in market value of equity can be
given mathematically as
MarketCap di f f = β0 +β1×NOR+ εi
where MarketCap di f f is the percentage change in the market value of equity from 2012
to 2016 for each firm, NOR is a dummy variable for whether the company is Norwegian or not,
β0 is the intercept, β1 is the difference in means between the Norwegian firms and the control
group, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Book Value of Equity
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in book value of equity can be given
mathematically as
BookEquity di f f = β0 +β1×NOR+ εi
where BookEquity di f f is the percentage change in the book value of equity from 2012 to
2016 for each firm, NOR is a dummy variable for whether the company is Norwegian or not,
β0 is the intercept, β1 is the difference in means between the Norwegian firms and the control
group, and εi is the error term with expected mean of zero.
Total Liabilities
The OLS-regression when using the percentage difference in total liabilities can be given math-
ematically as
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TotalLiabilities di f f = β0 +β1×NOR+ εi
where TotalLiabilities di f f is the percentage change in total liabilities from 2012 to 2016
for each firm, NOR is a dummy variable for whether the company is Norwegian or not, β0 is
the intercept, β1 is the difference in means between the Norwegian firms and the control group,




Table 1: NOR = 1 Year 2012
Table 2: NOR = 0 Year 2012
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for the matched treated and untreated groups for
mainland Norway excluding financial institutions after having controlled for outliers. There
are 48 pairs of observations. Nor = 1 are Norwegian firms and Nor = 0 are non-Norwegian
firms. Ideally, the tables would show identical numbers, affirming that companies from the
control and treatment group are homogeneous pre-treatment. However, this is not the case and
there are differences between the groups. Looking at mean values, the current ratio and fixed
assets variables indicate good matches but other variables have larger differences. Profitabil-
ity is negative for both Norwegian and non-Norwegian firms. This might be explained by a
significant part of the observed firms being small companies in high-growth phases, lacking
market-able products to yield them substantial profits.
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Figure 3: Debt to market value of equity. Mainland Norway excluding financial institutions.
Figure 3 depicts the change in the market debt to equity ratio for mainland companies excluding
financial institutions during the time period 2012 to 2016 for Norwegian and non-Norwegian
companies. It is possible to see that for both Norwegian and non-Norwegian firms that the
market value debt to equity ratio has decreased. The decrease from 2012 to 2016 appears to be
of the same size for both groups. This could be explained by the global surge in stock markets
during the time period. However, for Norwegian companies the decreases appear from years
2013 to 2014 and 2015 to 2016 which is in line with when corporate tax rate changes have
been made. In total, it is not possible to distinguish from the figure that Norwegian firms have
reduced their ratios due to changes in the corporate tax rate. The next sections will attempt to
uncover these effects.
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6.2 Yearly Tax Change Model
6.2.1 OLS Regressions
Table 3: Yearly Tax Change Model Regressions
Table 3 shows five individual regressions with percentage changes debt to market value of
equity ratio, debt to book value of equity ratio, market value of equity, book value of equity,
and total liabilities as dependent variables, and yearly changes in the corporate tax rate as the
independent variable. Positive coefficients mean that a one percentage point increase in tax rate
increases the dependent variable, while negative coefficients show an inverse relationship.
Debt to Market Value of Equity Ratio
Regression (1) in table 3 shows an increase in the debt to market value of equity ratio of 0.08%
for each 1 percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate within a given year, but this change
is too small to be of statistical significance. This insignificance makes sense from a pecking
order theory perspective, but according to the trade-off theory, if there are no lags, there should
be a significant change as managers want to maximize the value of the firm at any time.
Debt to Book Value of Equity Ratio
Regression (2) in table 3 shows no significant effect from tax changes on the development of
the debt to book value of equity ratio in the given year.
Market Value of Equity
Regression (3) shows an inverse, but insignificant relation between the the market value of
equity and tax changes within a given year. Considering that in efficient markets a change in
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the market value of equity should occur as soon as a tax change is announced, this fits both
theories.
Book Value of Equity
Table 3 shows no significant effect from tax changes on the development of the book value of
equity in the given year
Total Liabilities
Regression (5) shows no significant effect from tax changes on the development of total liabil-
ities in the given year.
6.2.2 Testing of Assumptions
Linearity
Linearity illustrations in appendix G show that all regressions should fulfill the assumption of
linearity.
Random Sample
All available firms on the Norwegian Stock Exchange, excluding financial, shipping and oil re-
lated businesses, have been selected. The control sample is chosen from a matching algorithm.
Therefore the sample chosen should not break the random sample assumptions.
No Multicollinearity
There is only one independent variable and there is therefore no multicollinearity present.
Exogeneity
The exogeneity tests in appendix H show there might be exogenous factors in regression (1).
Spherical Errors
From appendix I, the IM-tests show there might be heteroskedasticity present for regressions
(1) and (2). Additionally, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test presented in appendix J
shows heteroskedasiticy for all regressions except regression (5). There also seems to be auto-




Normality-tests in appendices L, M, and N, seem to show that all regressions break this as-
sumption.
Fixed Effects
The fixed effects test presented in appendix O show that none of the regressions seem to suffer
from fixed effects.
Random Effects
The random effects test presented in appendix P show that none of the regressions seem to
suffer from random effects.
6.2.3 Discussion of Results
None of the regressions in the yearly tax change model show any significant effects on changes
in debt to market value of equity ratio, debt to book value of equity, market value of equity,
book value of equity, or total liabilities. This implies that we can not conclude that any of
these factors are affected by tax changes within a given year. As hypothesized earlier we would
expect the capital structure to change within the year of the tax change if managers acted
according to the trade-off theory, given there are no lags. The lack of changes in the capital
structure might therefore be in favor of the pecking order theory, or imply that from a trade-off





Table 4: DID Model Regressions
Table 4 shows six individual regressions with dependent variables being the percentage changes
from 2012 to 2016 for debt to market value of equity ratio, the log transformation of debt to
market value of equity ratio, debt to book value of equity ratio, market value of equity, book
value of equity, and total liabilities. The independent variable, NOR, is a dummy variable
stating whether or not the firm is Norwegian and as result has undergone a change in corporate
tax rate. The coefficients therefore simply state the differences between Norwegian and non-
Norwegian firms.
Debt to Market Value of Equity Ratio
As shown in table 4, regressing the percentage change in the debt to market value of equity ratio
on treatment shows that in the sample, Norwegian firms reduced their debt to market value of
equity ratio by 85.7% compared to the control group. This figure is significant at the 1.7% level,
and might indicate that the tax reduction had an effect on the capital structure of Norwegian
firms. The model has an explanatory value of 4.9% as implied by the adjusted R-squared.
Log Transformation of Debt to Market Value of Equity Ratio
Regression (2) in table 4 show significant changes in the log transformation of the debt to
market value of equity ratio. The regression was included to affirm the validity of regression
(1), as regression (1) did not fulfill all OLS assumptions presented in the methodology section.
43
Debt to Book Value of Equity Ratio
Regressing the percentage change in the debt to book value of equity ratio on the treatment
shows a reduction in the ratio for Norwegian firms, but this figure is not significant at the 5%
level, and we are not able to conclude that there are any differences between the Norwegian
sample and the control sample.
Market Value of Equity
Regressing the percentage change in market value of equity on the treatment shows an increase
for Norwegian firms, but this figure is not significant at the 5% level, and we are not able to
conclude that there are any differences between the Norwegian sample and the control sample.
Book Value of Equity
Regressing the percentage change in book value of equity on the treatment shows a reduction
for Norwegian firms, but this figure is not significant at the 5% level, and we are not able to
conclude that there are any differences between the Norwegian sample and the control sample.
Total Liabilities
Regressing the percentage change in total liabilities on the treatment shows a reduction for
Norwegian firms, but this figure is not significant at the 5% level, and we are not able to
conclude that there are any differences between the Norwegian sample and the control sample.
6.3.2 Testing of Assumptions
Linearity
Considering the independent variable NOR is a dummy variable for all the regressions, linearity
should be satisfied as there are only two points on the x-axis.
Random Sample
All available firms on the Norwegian Stock Exchange, excluding financial, shipping and oil re-
lated businesses, have been selected. The control sample is chosen from a matching algorithm.
Therefore the sample chosen should not break the random sample assumption.
No Multicollinearity
There is only one independent variable and there is therefore no multicollinearity present.
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Exogeneity
Exogenuity tests presented in appendix Q show some proof of exogeneity for regressions (1)
and (2).
Spherical Errors
From appendix R, the IM-tests show there might be heteroskedasticity present for the regres-
sion (3). Additionally, Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests presented in appendix S show
heteroskedasicity for all regressions except the regression (2).
Normality
Normality-test in appendices T, U, and V, show that all regressions except regression (2) seem
to break this assumption.
6.3.3 Discussion of Results
Results from the DID models show no significant differences between the treatment and the
control group for changes in debt to book value of equity ratio, market value of equity, book
value of equity, or total liabilities. For changes in the debt to market value of equity ratio the
analysis show that while the control group increased this ratio by 79.6%, the Norwegian firms
reduced the ratio by 6.1%, which is a difference of 85.7%. The assumptions for this regres-
sion were broken, but when log transforming the dependent variable, all assumptions, with the
exception of endogeneity, are fulfilled, and the results from the regression might therefore be
considered significant. This might indicate that the reduction in the Norwegian corporate tax
rate from 2012 to 2016 causes Norwegian firms to change their capital structure by reducing the
debt to market value of equity ratio. We expected an increase in the market value of equity and
a decrease in total liabilities, and from the coefficients it might seem this is the development
that happened in the period, but these changes are not statistically significant. While figure 3
illustrates that the mean of the debt to market value of equity has decreased for both groups,
the DID model indicates that the mean of the percentage change for the individual firms has
increased for the control group. This can be explained for instance by firms with low ratios
doubling their debt or so. For example, a firm increasing its debt to equity ratio from 0.04 to
0.08 would have the same effect on the models as a firm increasing their ratio from 4 to 8.
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6.4 Testing of Other Assumptions
6.4.1 Propensity Score Matching Assumptions
Conditional Independence Assumption
The conditional independence assumption should be considered broken as all firms subject
to the treatment are Norwegian firms, while those that are not subject to the treatment are
non-Norwegian firms. In this sense factors that affect the outcomes that are only subject to
Norwegian firms, and independent of the treatment itself, might occur.
Common Support Condition
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in appendix F show that all matching variables except prof-
itability fulfill the common support condition. In future matching models we might therefore
consider removing this as a variable.
Balancing Condition
T-tests for the balancing condition for propensity score matching is presented in appendix E,
and implies that all matching variables fulfill this assumption.
6.4.2 Difference-in-Differences Assumptions
Difference-in-differences assumes parallel trends before the treatment. Considering the volatil-
ity of some of the variables, mainly the debt to market value of equity ratio, this assumption
is likely to have been broken. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude that any differences
between the two groups are a result of changes in corporate tax rates.
6.5 Comparing Results From Both Models
The DID model finds a significant reduction in the debt to market value of equity ratio for
Norwegian firms in the period 2012 to 2016. The yearly tax change model is not able to
isolate this reduction to the yearly tax changes, which might be because firms do not change
their capital structure immediately when a tax change is implemented, but rather adjust before,
during, and after said change. Economic intuition would suggest that the market value of equity
would increase when the corporate tax rate is reduced, but the DID model was unable to find
any significant increases for the treatment group. As discussed in our hypotheses, both models
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should expect a reduction in the debt to equity ratio. If managers act according to the trade-
off theory, and there are no lags, we would expect this reduction to occur within the year of
the tax reduction. The results might therefore indicate that managers are more prone to act in
accordance with the pecking order theory, or that the costs of immediately changing the capital
structure exceed the benefits of doing so.
47
7 Limitations
Our analyses are highly limited by the small sample size of listed, mainland, non-financial
Norwegian firms affected by the reductions in the corporate tax rate. The small sample size
allows individual firms to heavily influence the analyses, and reduces the likelihood of finding
significant results. Consequently, this also makes it difficult to analyze individual industries, as
the small sample size would be especially prominent in such analyses.
Additionally, other assumptions made for our models are not fulfilled. For instance, the propen-
sity score matching assumes conditional independence, which is not fulfilled due to macroe-
conomic factors specific to the Norwegian economy that might affect the capital structure of
firms. Such factors mainly include the major reduction in the oil price, and the depreciation
of the Norwegian Krone, but might include additional macroeconomic factors (Seeking Alpha,
2016). The exact factors deciding the capital structure of a firm, are also subject to debate, and
the matching algorithm used in the thesis is subject to improvement.
The debt to equity ratios were more volatile than first expected, which might break the as-
sumption of parallel trends for the difference-in-differences estimator.
The small sample size, and the conditional dependence of the observations also causes several
OLS assumptions to be unfulfilled in both the event study and the yearly tax change model.
Considering these issues, we should be careful when interpreting the results of the analyses.
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8 Further Research
There are a number of items we would suggest for further research. Primarily, it would be ad-
vantageous to develop a matching algorithm that is superior to ours, and is able to find a control
group that closest resemble the treatment group. To do so, it is imperative to truly find what
factors affect the capital structure of enterprises.
We are also interested in seeing how a change in the corporate tax rate affects different in-
dustries including financial services, but in order to do so we would need a larger sample of
firms. Similarly, seeing how multinational corporations react to such tax changes would be of
huge interest. Such companies are able to transfer debt within different subsidiaries, and can
therefore focus the main part of their debt to countries with high corporate tax rates to maxi-
mize their tax shields. As a result, we would expect these corporations to be more affected by
changes in the corporate tax rate than other corporations.
Finally, the major changes in the oil price and the value of the Norwegian Krone, combined
with a small sample size, causes this kind of analyses to have major flaws when done for the
Norwegian market. President Donald Trump of the United States of America has recently spo-
ken out against the American 35% corporate tax rate, and has proposed decreasing it to 20%
(Business Insider Nordic, 2017). If such a change were to happen immediately, and consider-
ing the large number of companies affected, it would provide a near-perfect environment for
studies such as the one done in this thesis.
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9 Conclusion
In our thesis we have used established economic theories on capital structure, such as the trade-
off theory and the pecking order theory, to determine the expected changes in capital structure
for Norwegian firms as a result of the recent reductions in the corporate tax rate. Through
economic intuition, we have hypothesized that firms will reduce their debt to equity ratios in
accordance with both theories. For the trade-off theory, we should expect such changes to oc-
cur in the year of the tax change, while the pecking order theory might lead to a more gradual
change in capital structure.
Our analyses show a comparatively reduced debt to market value of equity ratio for Norwegian
firms during the years 2012 to 2016. This corresponds with what we would expect according to
both trade-off theory and pecking order theory. We have not been able to isolate such changes
to the years in which tax changes occur, and consequently the pecking order theory might better
explain Norwegian firm behavior rather than the trade-off theory, or it might indicate that the
costs of immediately changing the capital structure exceed the benefits of doing so. We have
not been able to find statistically significant comparative changes in neither the debt to book
value of equity ratio, market value, book value, or total liabilities.
Because of the small Norwegian sample size, our results are heavily reliant on how non-
Norwegian firms have been matched with the treatment group. Several important assumptions
are not fulfilled, such as the conditional independence and parallel trends assumptions, and the
results are therefore not definite.
For future research we highly recommend determining the exact factors of capital structure
in firms to better control for such factors in analyses. We also recommend analyses between
industry groups, and of multinational corporations, to see if certain sectors are more sensitive
to changes in the tax rate. Finally, should the proposed 15 percentage point decrease in the U.S.
corporate tax rate be enacted this would create a much better environment for future research
on studies similar to our thesis.
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A Number of matched pairs per GIC Industry, Mainland Norway ex-
cluding financial enterprises
Figure 4: Number of matched pairs for each industry
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B List of companies with corresponding match, all GIC industries
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C List of companies with corresponding matches, Mainland Norway ex-
cluding financial enterprises
D Descriptive Statistics
(a) D/E (MV) including outliers (b) D/E (MV) excluding outliers
Figure 5
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(a) D/E (BV) including outliers (b) D/E (BV) excluding outliers
Figure 6
(a) D/E (MV) Mainland (b) D/E (MV) Mainland excluding financial firms
Figure 7
(a) D/E (BV) Mainland (b) D/E (BV) Mainland excluding financial firms
Figure 8
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E T-tests for Propensity Score Matching Balancing Condition
(a) Market Capitalization (b) Market Capitalization2
(c) Market Capitalization3 (d) Assets
(e) Assets2 (f) Assets3
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(a) Revenue (b) Revenue2
(c) Revenue3 (d) Profitability
(e) Fixed Assets (f) Fixed Assets Turnover
(g) Price to Book
Figure 10
60
F Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for Propensity Score Matching Common
Support Condition
(a) Market Capitalization (b) Assets
(c) Revenue (d) Profitability
(e) Fixed Assets (f) Fixed Assets Turnover
(g) Current Ratio (h) Price to Book
Figure 11
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G Fitted Plot to test Linearity, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 12
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H Exogeneity tests, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 13
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I IM-tests for Heteroskedasticity, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 14
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J Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg for Heteroskedasticity, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 15
K Wooldridge test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 16
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L Kernel Density Estimate to test Normality, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 17
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M Standardized Normal Probability Plot to test Normality, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 18
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N Q-Q plot to test Normality, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 19
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O Panel Data Fixed Effects test, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 20
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P Panel Data Random Effects test, YTC Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 21
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Q Exogeneity tests, DID Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 22
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R IM-tests for Heteroskedasticity, DID Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 23
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S Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg for Heteroskedasticity, DID Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 24
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T Kernel Density Estimate to test Normality, DID Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 25
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U Standardized Normal Probability Plot to test Normality, DID Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 26
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V Q-Q plot to test Normality, DID Model
(a) DEM diff (b) logDEM diff
(c) DEB diff (d) MarketCap diff
(e) BookEquity diff (f) TotalLiabilities diff
Figure 27
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